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Case No. 20090410-SC
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Petitioner,
vs.

WILLIAM THOMAS DOMINGUEZ,
Defendant/ Respondent.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals from its opinion in State v. Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, 206 P.3d 640
(Addendum A). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (WestSupp. 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Does a violation of rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
constitute a Fourth Amendment violation requiring suppression of the
evidence?
2. Is suppression of the evidence required under state law when a
magistrate fails to comply with the retention requirement of rule 40(i) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure?

Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision
of the court of appeals for correctness. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^f 9, 22 P.3d
1242. "The correctness of the court of appeals7 decision turns on whether that
court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate
standard of review." Id. Whether a violation of a procedural rule constitutes a
constitutional violation is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Burns
v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, ^ 6, 133 P.3d 370 (holding that "the application of
constitutional protections [is a] question[ ] of law" reviewed for correctness)/
The question of what remedy to apply when a magistrate fails to comply with
the retention requirements of rule 40 is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness. Cf. Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, % 19,

P.3d

(holdmg that "the question of what standard applies to determine an abuse of
privilege presents a question of law, which we review for correctness").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
The following provisions are reproduced in Addendum B: U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Utah R. Crim. P. 30; Utah R. Crim. P. 40.

_?-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with felony DUI, driving with alcohol in his body
with a no-alcohol license, driving on a revoked license, driving a veliicle without
proof of insurance, and engaging in a speed contest or exhibition. R. 2-3.
Defendant moved to suppress the blood alcohol evidence obtained pursuant to
a telephonic search warrant on the ground that the magistrate failed to comply
with the retention requirement of rule 40, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R.
17-18. The trial court denied the motion. R. 26-27, 29-30, 51. Defendant
thereafter entered conditional guilty pleas to DUI and no proof of insurance,
reserving his right to appeal the order denying his motion to suppress. R. 32-40.
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of zero-to-five years for DUI
and 180 days for no proof of insurance. R. 40.
Defendant appealed and the court of appeals reversed. Dominguez, 2009
UT App 73, at ^f 1. The court held that "the magistrate's failure to comply with
[the retention requirement of] rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
violated [Defendant's] Fourth Amendment rights/' requiring suppression. See
id. at Tf 1. It also held that suppression was required under this Court's decision
in Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79,206 P.3d 640. See Dominguez, 2006 UT App 73,
If 17. This Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Shortly after 1:00 a.m. on June 3, 2007, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper
Chris Turley stopped Dominguez for racing with another car. R. 22-23. In
speaking with Dominguez, Turley noticed that he "had red, bloodshot, glassy
looking eyes" and "that his speech was noticeably slurred." R. 23. When a
records check revealed that Dominguez's alcohol-restricted driver's license had
been revoked, Turley arrested him. R. 23. Wliile doing so, Turley "could smell
a strong odor of an alcohol beverage coming from [Dominguez7s] breath in the
open air." R. 23. Turley asked Dominguez to blow into a portable breathalyzer,
but Dominguez refused. R. 23. He also refused to submit to field sobriety tests.
R. 23. Turley read the applicable "DUI admonitions," but Dominguez "still
would not cooperate and refused to give a chemical test." R. 23.
After transporting Dominguez to the police station, Turley prepared a
written affidavit in support of a search warrant authorizing a blood draw. R. 51:
3. Shortly after 2:00 a.m., Turley telephoned Judge Brent West and informed
him "of the subject's name, the reason for the stop, [and] all of the clues [he]
observed . .. ." R. 51: 4-5. After being placed under oath, Turley read the
probable cause statement contained in the written affidavit. R. 51:5. Turley did
not read every line of the affidavit, but read verbatim that portion "establishing
the grounds for issuance of [the] search warrant," to wit:

-4-

On June 3rd 2007, at approximately 0102 hours, I observed a red
Honda Civic driving- southbound on Washington Boulevard at
2400 South in lane 1 racing a silver passenger car. The vehicle was
stopped by the activation of my emergency lights. I approached
the vehicle and William Dominguez [Defendant] was in the driver
seat not wearing a seat belt. Dominguez had red, bloodshot, glassy
looking eyes. As I spoke with Dominguez, I noticed that his speech
was noticeably slurred. I conducted a records check on Dominguez
using; his name and date of birth. This information revealed that
Dominguez had a [sic] alcohol revoked license and was an alcohol
restricted driver. Dominguez denied consuming any alcohol. I
placed Dominguez under arrest and could smell a strong odor of
an alcohol beverage coming from his breath in the open air.
I requested Dominguez blow into a portable breath tester, however
he refused to blow. When asked if he would allow me to conduct
field sobriety test, Dominguez said no and that he had been
through this before. Dominguez refused to submit to any DUI field
sobriety tests. I read Dominguez his DUI admonitions advising
him of the consequences of not submitting to my tests. Dominguez
still would not cooperate and refused to give a chemical test.
Dominguez has at least 4 prior DUI convictions in the past 10 years
and he is currently on parole for a felony DUI conviction.
R. 22-23; R. 51: 4-5. At 2:27 a.m., and at the direction of Judge West, Trooper
Turley signed the warrant authorizing the blood draw. R. 24; R. 51: 5-6.
Judge West did not record the testimony given by Turley over the
telephone, and thus was unable, "[a]t the time of issuance,... [to] retain and
seal a copy of the search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other
recorded testimony on which the warrant [was] based/' as required under rule
40. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40(i)(l). Judge Ernest Jones signed a return on the
search warrant the following day. R. 25; R. 51: 6.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the
testimony supporting a search warrant be recorded and that a copy of the
recording be retained by the magistrate at the time the search warrant is issued.
The Fourth Amendment imposes no such requirements. Accordingly, pursuant
to well-settled United States Supreme Court precedent, a violation of rule 40's
retention requirement does not rise to a Fourth Amendment violation subject to
suppression under the exclusionary rule.
Suppression is also not required under state law. In Anderson v. Taylor,
2006 UT 79,149 P.3d 352, this Court imposed a requirement on magistrates to
retain copies of all warrants issued and their supporting affidavits. The Court
also directed the adoption of a rule to implement its retention requirement.
However, it did not address the remedy to be applied in criminal cases when a
magistrate fails to comply with the retention requirement. Because rule 40,
which implements Anderson, does not specify a remedy, violations of the rule
are subject to harmless error analysis under rule 30 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Dominguez has not claimed, much less demonstrated, any
prejudice. Therefore, suppression of the evidence is not warranted.
This Court should thus reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
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ARGUMENT
The magistrate in this case did not record his telephone conversation with
Trooper Turley and thus was unable "[a]t the time of issuance, . . . [to] retain
and seal a copy of the search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other
recorded testimony on which the warrant [was] based/' as required under rule
40. See Utah R. Grim. P. 40(i)(l). Contrary to the decision of the court of appeals
below, suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant is not
required under either the Fourth Amendment or Utah law.1
I.
A MAGISTRATE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
RETENTION REQUIREMENT OF RULE 40 OF THE UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DOES
NOT
CONSTITUTE A FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION
In the court of appeals, Dominguez argued "that the magistrate's failure
to comply with rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure violated his
1

The recording requirement of rule 40(Z) was satisfied when Trooper
Turley reduced the search warrant affidavit to writing. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40
(a)(2), (Z)(2) (providing that recording "includes the original recording of
testimony" and may be "by writing"). Although rule 40 does not explicitly
impose a recording duty on the magistrate, the court of appeals held that in the
case of telephonic warrants, magistrates have a recording duty by reason of their
duty to retain the search warrant documents. Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, \ 11.
The State maintains that magistrates have no duty to retain that which they have
never obtained, but assumes the correctness of the court of appeals' holding for
purposes of the questions presented here. Alternatively, the Court should
recognize an exception to the retention requirement where compliance is
impractical. As a matter of public policy, it is better for officers to obtain judicial
approval for a search than have to rely on the exigent circumstances exception.
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Fourth Amendment rights/ 7 Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, %^ 1, 6. The court of
appeals "agree[d]." Id. at ^ 1. The court's holding squarely conflicts with
controlling Fourth Amendment precedent and should be reversed.
* **

Last year, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that" 'whether or
not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment'... has
never ' depend [ed] on the law of the particular State in which the search
occurs.'" Virginia v. Moore, _ U.S. _ , 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604 (2008) (quoting
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)). The Court acknowledged that
States are "free 'to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than
required by the Federal Constitution.'" Id. (quoting Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 62).
The Court held, however, that "when States go above the Fourth Amendment
minimum, the Constitution's protections conceriiing search and seizure remain
the same." Id. at 1605. In other words, "[a] State is free to prefer one searchand-seizure policy among the range of constitutionally permissible options, but
its choice of a more restrictive option does not render the less restrictive ones
unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional." Id. at 1606.
Against this backdrop of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court in
Moore addressed whether an arrest for a misdemeanor offense, prohibited under
state law, constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 1601. The Supreme
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Court held that it did not. The Court observed that pursuant to a long line of
cases, an arrest is "constitutionally reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment so
long as the officer "has probable cause to believe [the arrestee] committed even a
minor crime in his presence/' Moore, 129 S.Ct. at 1604. The Court concluded
that California's law prohibiting misdemeanor arrests did not "chang[e] this
calculus/' See id.
Like the California law prohibiting misdemeanor arrests, Utah's
requirement that magistrates retain the search warrant documents is exclusively
a matter of state rule, not constitutional law. Nothing in the language of the
Fourth Amendment, or in United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting
that language, suggests that a probable cause statement must be recorded and
retained by the issuing magistrate. The Fourth Amendment requires only that
warrants be issued "upon probable cause, [be] supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons
or tilings to be seized." U.S. Const, amend. IV; accord Delia v. United States, 441
U.S 238, 255 (1979). These requirements "are precise and clear," Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965), and Dominguez has never argued that the
warrant in this case failed to satisfy those requirements. See Aplt. Brf.;
Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, *{ 17.
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In sum, the imposition of additional warrant requirements under rule 40
is a matter of state rule-making, not constitutional law. Accordingly, any failure
of the magistrate in this case to comply with rule 40's retention requirement
does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. The court of appeals'
decision to the contrary should be reversed. 2
II.
A MAGISTRATE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
RETENTION REQUIREMENT OF RULE 40 OF THE UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DOES NOT REQUIRE
EXCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE UNDER STATE LAW
The court of appeals held that the magistrate's failure to comply with rule
40's retention requirement also requires suppression under state law.
Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, ^ 12-18. The court acknowledged rule 30 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and surveyed case law from other
jurisdictions, but relied on neither in reaching its decision. See id. at ^

12-16.

Instead, the court construed this Court's decision in Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT
79, 149 P.3d 352, as imposing a sort of strict liability for any violation of the
2

Even if it could be said that a magistrate's failure to comply with rule
40's retention requirement constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation, the law is
well settled that "the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates." United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984). Earlier this year, the high court reaffirmed this
limit on the exclusionary rule's reach: "The exclusionary rule was crafted to curb
police rather than judicial misconduct." Herring v. United States, U.S. , 129
S.Ct. 695, 701 (2009). In this case, no one has alleged police misconduct. The
error was that of the magistrate's and as such, suppression is not warranted.
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retention requirement. See Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, ^f 17. "[I]nterpret[ing]
Anderson to mean that [this] Court intended to take a strong position on the
issue/' the court of appeals "instructed] the trial court to grant Defendant's
motion to suppress/' Id. Contrary to the court of appeals' holding, Anderson
does not compel suppression and this Court should reverse.
* **

In a petition for extraordinary writ, the petitioner in Anderson challenged
the Fourth District Court's practice of not retaining copies of search warrants
and their supporting documentation. 2006 UT 79, ^f 1. This Court concluded
that the district court's practice was "inconsistent with . . . statutory
requirements" and, pursuant to its supervisory authority, // require[d] that
[magistrates] retain copies of all warrants issued and the documents supporting
the requests for such warrants." Id. at ^ 18, 26. The Court "le[ftj to [its] rulemaking process the particular mechanisms for implementing this requirement
and managing these records." Id. at ^ 26. The Court did not address the
remedy to be applied in a criminal case where the magistrate fails to comply
with the retention requirement. See id. at ^ 21-26. That remedy is found in the
rules of criminal procedure.
Rule 40 does not identify a remedy for violations specific to that rule.
Accordingly, violations of the rule are subject to rule 30 of the Utah Rules of
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Criminal Procedure. See State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258,1261-62 (Utah 1983)
(applying rule 30 in disregarding an alleged defect in a warrant affidavit).
Under rule 30, "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded/ 7 Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). In
other words, a violation of rule 40 does not require suppression if the error is
harmless, i.e., if the error "is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no
reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings/' State v.
Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^ 20, 20 P.3d 888.3
The burden of showing harm or prejudice for non-constitutional error
rests with the defendant. See State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, % 94, 63 P.3d 731
(holding that" [t]he burden of showing [harm] rests on the complaining party").
To show harm, the defendant must establish that "the error is substantial and
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence
there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." State v.
Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989). Stated another way, the defendant
must demonstrate that but for the error, "the likelihood of a different outcome is

If the error "results in the deprivation of a constitutional right," it will be
disregarded only if the State can establish that the error was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Calliliam, 2002 UT 86, ^f 45,55 P.3d 573. As explained
supra, at 7-10, the magistrate's failure to retain the search warrant documents
did not amount to constitutional error.

sufficiently high that it undermines [the Court's] confidence in the outcome/'
Evans, 2001 UT 22, % 20.
As acknowledged by the court of appeals, Dominguez "has not
challenged the warrant on probable cause grounds or otherwise contested it/ 7
Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, ^f 17. He has not claimed that the warrant lacked
probable cause, that it was not supported by oath or affirmation, or that it did
not otherwise meet the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
See Aplt. Brf. at 6-13. Dominguez, therefore, does not claim and has not
demonstrated that the magistrate's failure to comply with rule 40's retention
requirement "had any adverse affect upon his substantial rights, nor ha[s] [he]
shown that such failure in any way compromised the integrity of the
documents/' Anderton, 668 P.2d at 1262. Thus, as in Anderton, the alleged rule
violation here "constitute[s] nothing more than the failure to perform a
ministerial act which did not affect the validity of the search warrant and the
search conducted thereunder." Id. As such, this Court is "obliged to disregard
the 'defect' . . . by reason of the content of Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure." See id. at 1261-62.
The court of appeals asserts, however, that "without a recording [in the
possession of the magistrate], any attempt by [Dominguez] to challenge
probable cause may require him to forfeit his Fifth Amendment right to remain
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silent/7 Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, ^f 17. That assertion is incorrect. The law
is well settled that "when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to
suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not
thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt." Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968); accord State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 49
n.4, 63 P.3d 650.
The court of appeals further opined that "the potential problems of
mishandling or alteration" of search warrant documents also support a rule of
strict liability. Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, f 17. The State agrees that the best
practice is that required under rule 40, i.e., that the magistrate make and retain a
copy of the warrant documents at the time of issuance. However, where a
magistrate fails to do so, per se exclusion of the State's evidence— obtained in
good faith and consistent with this Court's preference for warrants — is a remedy
disproportionate to the wrong.
hi sum, failure to comply with a requirement of rule 40 that does not rise
to a constitutional violation is subject to harmless error analysis under rule 30, as
is any other rule violation. Dominguez has never alleged, much less shown, that
he suffered any prejudice as a result of the magistrate's error. Even if the
magistrate had complied with rule 40's retention requirement, the search would
still have taken place. Therefore, the evidence should not be suppressed.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted September 11, 2009.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

-REY S. GRAY

assistant Attorney GeneFal
Counsel for Petitioner
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ADDENDUM A

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

OPINION
^For Official Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20070865-CA
F I L E D
(March 19, 2009)

William Thomas Dominguez,
Defendant and Appellant,

2009 UT Apr) 73

Second District, Ogden Department, 071901654
The Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan
Attorneys:

Randall W. Richards, Ogden, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lak£
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and Davis.
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
tl
Defendant William Thomas Dominguez was convicted of one
count of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI), a
third-degree felony in violation of Utah Code section 41-6a-502,
see Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (2005). He asserts that the
evidence against him should have been suppressed, contending that
the arresting officer, Trooper Chris Turley, unlawfully obtained
a warrant from the magistrate. Specifically, he argues that the
magistrate's failure to comply with rule 40 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We
agree and reverse.
BACKGROUND
^i2
On June 3, 2007, Trooper Turley stopped Defendant in his
automobile at approximately 1:00 a.m. Defendant appeared to be
racing his car against another car. While speaking to Defendant,
Trooper Turley observed "red, bloodshot, glassy looking eyes" and
slurred speech. Trooper Turley checked Defendant's driver
license and discovered that it had been revoked for alcoholrelated offenses. Trooper Turley arrested Defendant and, during

the arrest, smelled alcohol on Defendant's breath. Trooper
Turley asked Defendant to submit to breathalyzer and field
sobriety tests, but Defendant refused.
f3
After taking Defendant to the police station, Trooper Turley
prepared a written affidavit in support of a search warrant
authorizing a blood draw. He then telephoned Judge Brent West.
Judge West placed Trooper Turley under oath, after which the
officer told Judge West "the subject's name, the reason for the
stop, [and] all of the clues [he] observed." Trooper Turley read
significant portions of his written affidavit to Judge West but
did not read every line. After hearing Trooper Turley's
statement, Judge West directed Trooper Turley to sign the
affidavit with his own name and also to sign Judge West's name.
Trooper Turley followed these directions. The telephone
conference was not otherwise recorded.
1[4
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol, driving with alcohol in his body with a no-alcohol
license, driving on a revoked license, driving a vehicle without
proof of insurance, and engaging in a speed contest or
exhibition. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence,
arguing that the warrant had not been obtained according to the
proper procedures. Defendant did not challenge the probable
cause element. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Trooper
Turley testified, but the magistrate did not. Trooper Turley
described his telephone conversation with Judge West but not the
circumstances leading to Defendant's arrest. The motion to
suppress was denied by the court. Defendant then entered a
conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence and
driving without proof of insurance. Defendant now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
%5
Defendant asks us to consider whether the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result
of the search warrant. Defendant argues that the telephonic
warrant did not comply with rule 4 0 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and that this alleged violation merits suppression of
the evidence. We examine first whether there was an error and,
second, whether the error caused harm sufficient to merit
suppressing the evidence. The analysis and required application
of this rule is a matter of first impression. We review the
trial court's interpretation of a rule of procedure for
correctness. See Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, f 5, 989 P.2d
1073 .

20070865-CA

2

ANALYSIS
I.

The Telephonic Warrant Did Not Comply with Rule 40
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

f6
Defendant argues that the procedure followed by Trooper
Turley and the magistrate violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, see
U.S. Const, amend. IV, asserting that it did not comply with the
requirements of rule 4 0 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The relevant part of rule 4 0 states:
At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall
retain and seal a copy of the search warrant,
the application and all affidavits or other
recorded testimony on which the warrant is
based and shall, within a reasonable time,
file those sealed documents in court files
which are secured against access by the
public.
Utah R. Crim. P. 40(i) (l).1 Defendant contends that, in issuing
the warrant telephonically, the magistrate failed to retain,
seal, or file the documents, insisting that it must be the
magistrate, not the officer, who complies with rule 40's
requirements.
\l
Rule 40 (i) (1) was implemented in response to recent guidance
from the Utah Supreme Court. See id. R. 40 (i) (1) Advisory
Committee Notes (" (i) Subsection (1) is added in compliance with
the order of the Utah Supreme Court in Anderson v. Taylor, 2 0 06
UT 79 (filed December 5, 2006).").
1[8
In Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79, 149 P.3d 352, the Utah
Supreme Court reviewed the Fourth District Court's customary
procedures for issuing search warrants. See id. ^| 1. The Fourth
District Court did not retain copies of search warrants or their
supporting documentation. See id. \ 2. Instead,
after issuing a warrant, the issuing
magistrate return[ed] both the warrant and
the supporting material to the law
enforcement officer seeking the warrant.
1. "'Recorded' or 'recording' includes the original recording of
testimony, a return or other communication or any copy, printout,
facsimile, or other replication that is intended by the person
making the recording to have the same effect as the original."
Utah R. Crim. P. 40(a)(2).

20070865-CA

3

After the warrant [wa]s executed, the officer
deliver [ed] the original warrant, the
supporting material, the return, and the
inventory of items seized in the search to
the magistrate, who then review[ed] it and
either fil [ed] it with the court or
return[ed] it to law enforcement with a
request that law enforcement file it with the
court.
Id. % 2. The supreme court invalidated this practice.
f 26. We quote liberally:

See id,

Giving law enforcement sole custody of all
affidavits and warrants up through the point
where the warrant has been executed and a
return filed is inherently problematic for at
least two reasons. First, it leaves the
court without any record of the [warrant] or
the materials supporting its issuance until
after the [warrant] is executed and a return
filed. Second, it allows for the possibility
that affidavits and other court records may
be mishandled or even altered without
detection. When the records upon which the
magistrate acts in issuing a warrant are
handled by persons other than court personnel
prior to being filed with the court, the
court has no basis for confidence in the
accuracy, authenticity, or completeness of
those documents. In the matter of warrants
for the search and seizure of persons or
property, more is required. We accordingly
require that magistrates issuing search
warrants retain in their custody copies! Of
all search warrants issued, as well 3 S the
material supporting ssearch warrant
applications, rather than surrender:Lng to law
enforcement the only copies of such man.erial.
To ensure the integrity of our court
records, we have concluded that the courts of
this state must retain copies of all search
warrants and supporting material.
Id. \^ 22-23 (emphasis added). The supreme court indicated that
it did not have the authority "to prescribe the particular
procedures to be followed in maintaining and disclosing' such
records" but instructed the appropriate body to do so. Id. % 23.
Rule 40 (i) was adopted in response and became effective April 30,
2007. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40 (i) (1) Advisory Committee Note (i).
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^9
The State attempts to distinguish Anderson by pointing out
that Anderson did not involve a telephonic warrant and that in
the context of a telephone request for a warrant, the court
cannot "retain" what it never had. Section (1) of rule 40 allows
a peace officer to obtain a search warrant remotely, i.e.,
telephonically, including entering the magistrate's signature, if
so directed by the magistrate. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40(1) (1),
(4). That section further states that n[t]he testimony and
content of the warrant shall be recorded . . . by writing or by
mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by
other means." Id. R. 40(1) (2) . Although the rule does not
specify by whom the recording must be made, the State suggests
that this can be accomplished by the peace officer. However,
subsection (1) (5) requires compliance with section (i) : "[t] he
warrant and recorded testimony shall be retained by and filed
with the court pursuant to Section (i), " id. R. 40(1) (5), which
assigns that responsibility to the magistrate, see id. R. 40(i) .
Subsection (1)(5) was also amended in response to Anderson.
Compare id^ R. 40(1) (2008) with id. (2006).
IflO Although it is not controlling, the corresponding federal
rule offers insight as to how these sections might co-exist.
Rule 41(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that a magistrate judge, issuing a warrant by telephone, must
"make a verbatim record of the conversation with a suitable
recording device, if available, or by a court reporter, or in
writing." Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)(3)(B)(ii). Federal rule
41(e)(3) further requires that the applicant for a search warrant
"must prepare a 'proposed duplicate original warrant' and must
read or otherwise transmit the contents of that document verbatim
to the magistrate judge," and "the magistrate judge must enter
those contents into an original warrant." Id. R. 41(e) (3) (A) ,
(B) .
^11 Because the language at issue was added in direct response
to the Utah Supreme Court's desire to ensure "that the issuing
court will maintain reliable records of the warrants and the
documents supporting them," Anderson, 2006 UT 79, f 26, and since
the federal rules explicitly outline a method whereby this may be
accomplished in securing a telephonic warrant, see Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41, we conclude that rule 40 (i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires the magistrate to make and keep a copy of the
search warrant and supporting documents; it is not sufficient for
the peace officer alone to retain this information and
subsequently supply it to the court. Accordingly, the warrant at
issue in this case did not comply with rule 40 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
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II.

Reversible Error

f12 We now consider whether this violation merited suppressing
the evidence. Under rule 3 0 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, n[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Indeed, the State argues
that the violation here "constituted nothing more than the
failure to perform a ministerial act which did not affect the
validity of the search warrant and the search conducted
thereunder," see State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah
1983) .
Hl3 Federal circuits applying rule 4" 'c) of the Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure and state courts a plying rules similar to
that rule have addressed whether evidence obtained pursuant to
warrants issued in violation of federal rule 41(c) should be
excluded on a case-by-case basis. For example, in United States
v. Rome, 809 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1987), the peace officer and the
magistrate had several telephone conversations during the course
of an afternoon and evening. See id. at 666.
Only the last of
these conversations, the one in which the search warrant was
actually issued, was recorded or retained. See id. at
665-66.
The Rome court determined that the error was not sufficient to
justify excluding the evidence obtained via the search warrant,
embracing a standard written by the Ninth Circuit:
"Unless there is a clear constitutional
violation, non-compliance with Rule 41 [of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure]
requires suppression of evidence only where
(1) there was 'prejudice1 in the sense that
the search might not have occurred or would
not have been so abrasive if the rule had
been followed, or (2) there is evidence of
intentional and deliberate disregard of a
provision in the rule."
Id. at 669 (quoting United States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d 1231,
1235 (9th Cir. 1980)). The Rome court determined that "[t]here
[was] nothing in the record to suggest that Rome's Fourth
Amendment rights were violated [because] [p]robable cause was
amply demonstrated in the recorded testimony upon which the
search warrant was based." Id. at 670. The court did, however,
offer this warning:
We do not condone careless police work and
lack of preparation, nor do we hold that the
failure to understand the rules governing
their conduct will excuse law enforcement
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officers from compliance therewith. We
simply hold that m this case, [the peace
officer and magistrate] complied with the
spirit, if not the letter, of Rule 41(c) (2)
Id.
^14 Similarly, m United States v. Chaar, 137 F.3d 359 (6th Cir.
1998), the Sixth Circuit ruled that a violation of rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not affect the
admissibility of evidence. See id. at 365. The court there
considered federal rule 41(c)(2)(d), which, at the time, required
that the magistrate record a telephone call for a search warrant,
either by voice recording, stenographic, or longhand verbatim.
See Fed. R. C n m . P. 41(c)(2)(d) (1993) (amended 2002). In that
case, a tape recording was made of the telephone conversation m
which the magistrate authorized the search warrant, but the tape
was subsequently lost. See Chaar, 137 F.3d at 360-61. Nineteen
months later, the investigating agent provided an affidavit
recalling the facts. Id. at 360 n.l, 366. In determining that
the error did not merit reversal, the Chaar court noted that
"there was significant evidence supporting probable cause m this
case." Id. at 364. The court relied on United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, for the "good faith exception" to search warrant
requirements. See Chaar, 137 F.3d at 364. The Sixth Circuit has
summarized Leon as follows:
"The exclusionary rule should be modified so
as not to bar the admission of evidence
seized m reasonable, good-faith reliance on
a search warrant that is subsequently held to
be defective.
[Leon] noted four specific situations where
the good faith reliance exception would not
apply: (1) where the supporting affidavit
contained knowing or reckless falsity; (2)
where the issuing magistrate failed to act m
a neutral and detached fashion, and served
merely as a rubber stamp for the police; (3)
where the supporting affidavit did not
provide the magistrate with a substantial
basis for determining the existence of
probable cause, or ±n other words, where the
warrant application was supported by
[nothing] more than a 'bare bones' affidavit;
and (4) where the officer's reliance on the
warrant was neither m good faith nor
objectively reasonable.
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Id. (emphasis and alterations in original) (quoting United States
v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359, 1366 (6th Cir. 1993)). The Sixth
Circuit's stated policy was that "'[t]he exclusionary rule is
designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the
errors of judges and magistrates.' We do not exclude evidence,
absent constitutional violations, unless the exclusion furthers
the purpose of the exclusionary rule." Id. at 361 (additional
citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
916). But see Chaar, 137 F.3d at 366 (Dowd, J., dissenting)
(finding the violation "to be more than a mere 'technical1
violation" because "the only evidence of the conversation
presented to the district court at the suppression hearing was
the affidavit of the affiant, executed nineteen months after the
issuance of the warrant" and there was no testimony whatsoever by
the magistrate judge).
Kl5 By contrast, in State v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1993),
the Minnesota Supreme Court excluded evidence based on a
violation of the search warrant rule. See id. at 22. Minnesota
followed the federal rules for securing telephonic search
warrants. See id. at 19. Although the magistrate authorized the
warrant by phone, "[the] telephone conversation was not recorded.
The officer did not read his statement from a prepared written
application or from any notes, nor, apparently, did the judge
make any significant notes of what was said over the telephone."
Id. at 19. The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the
warrant was not valid, stating,
The purpose of these procedures is to
have a record made contemporaneously with the
authorization of the search warrant that will
show both probable cause for a search and a
reasonable need for the warrant to be issued
telephonically, so that later, if need be,
there is a basis for challenging the warrant
that is nor: dependent solely on after-thefact recollections.
Id. at 20. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions that
the evidence must be suppressed. Id. at 18.
%1S Similarly, in Volz v. State, 773 N.E.2d 894 (Ind. Ct. App.
2 002), the Indiana Court of Appeals invalidated a search warrant
that had been recorded on a faulty tape recorder when the
recorder did not record the entire conversation. See id. at 8 9697. The Indiana statute in effect required that a magistrate
issuing a telephonic search warrant "shall record the
conversation on audio tape and order the court reporter to type
or transcribe the recording for entry in the record." See Ind.
Code Ann. § 35-33-5-8 (b) (LexisNexis 1990). After learning that
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their telephone conversation had not been recorded, the peace
officer and magistrate testified at a hearing to reconstruct
their conversation. See Volz, 773 N.E.2d at 896. The court held
this was not sufficient because without a recording, "neither the
validity of the warrant nor [the officer's] reasonable belief
that the warrant was valid is capable of independent verification
through judicial review." Id. at 899. Accordingly, the court
reversed the matter and instructed the trial court to grant the
defendant's motion to suppress. See id.
fl7 Because this is an issue of first impression, we are left to
decide for the first time how strictly rule 40 should be enforced
in Utah. Although we recognize that Defendant has not challenged
the warrant on probable cause grounds or otherwise contested it,2
we take Anderson's mandate seriously. Indeed, without a
recording, any attempt by Defendant to challenge probable cause
may require him to forfeit his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent:. We assume that the Utah Supreme Court wishes this rule
to be followed strictly now that it has been implemented.
Anderson offered clear public policy support for its mandate, and
the result of the Fourth District Court's procedure had no
different effect than the result here. Similarly, the potential
problems of mishandling or alteration identified in Anderson also
exist in telephonic warrant requests. We interpret Anderson to
mean that the Utah Supreme Court intended to take a strong
position on the issue. Thus, rule 40 is unambiguous in setting
forth the courts' responsibility when issuing search warrants,
including those sought telephonically. Accordingly, we reverse
and instruct the trial court to grant Defendant's motion to
suppress .3
CONCLUSION
^18 Rule 40 (i) (1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that magistrates, not solely peace officers, "retain and
seal a copy of the search warrant, the application and all
affidavits or other recorded testimony on which the warrant is
based," Utah R. Crim. P. 40 (i) (1) . The magistrate in this case

2. Defendant does not argue that the officer's reading of only
portions of his affidavit to the magistrate invalidated the
search warrant. We, however, believe that selective
communication of the affidavit may be problematic.
3. We note that there may be sufficient evidence without the
excluded results of the blood draw to nevertheless support a
conviction.
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did not do so. We conclude this was reversible error and reverse
and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

^19

WE CONCUR:

William A. Thorne Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge

James Z. Davis, Judge
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ADDENDUM B

U.S. Const, amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Wairants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Rule 30. Errors and Defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the
court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order.
Rule 40. Search Warrants.
(a) Definitions.
As used in this rule:
(a)(1) "Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m. and ending at 10 p.m.
local time.
(a)(2) "Recorded" or "recording" includes the original recording of testimony,
a return or other communication or any copy, printout, facsimile, or other
replication that is intended by the person making the recording to have the same
effect as the original.
(a)(3) "Search warrant" is an order issued by a magistrate in the name of the
state and directed to a peace officer, describing with particularity the thing, place,
or person to be searched and the property or evidence to be seized and includes an
original written or recorded warrant or any copy, printout, facsimile or other
replica intended by the magistrate issuing the warrant to have the same effect as
the original.
(b) Grounds for issuance.
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search warrant if there is
probable cause to believe it:
(b)(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(b)(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being used to commit or
conceal the commission of an offense; or
(b)(3) is evidence of illegal conduct.
B-l

(c) Conditions precedent to issuance.
(c)(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and shall particularly describe the person or place to be
searched and the person, property, or evidence to be seized.
(c)(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in
the possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause
shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to the
alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by the
magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by subpoena,
or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if
sought by subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant issued, the
magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such conditions that reasonably afford
protection of the following interests of the person or entity in possession of such
evidence:
(c)(2)(A) protection against unreasonable interference with normal business;
(c)(2)(B) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential
sources of information; or
(c)(2)(C) protection against prior or direct restraints on constitutionally
protected rights.
(d) Search warrant sewed in readable form.
A copy of a search warrant shall be served in a readable form upon the person
or place to be searched.
(e) Time for senice—Officer may request assistance.
(e)(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that it be served in
the daytime, unless the affidavit or recorded testimony states sufficient grounds to
believe a search is necessaiy in the night to seize the property prior to its being
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason; in which case
the magistrate may insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or night.
(e)(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of
issuance. Any search warrant not executed within this time shall be void and shall
be returned to the court or magistrate as not executed.
(e)(3) An officer may request other persons to assist in conducting the search.
(f) Receipt for property taken.
The officer, when seizing property pursuant to a search warrant, shall give a
receipt to the person from whom it was seized or in whose possession it was
found. If no person is present, the officer shall leave the receipt in the place where
the property was found.
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(g) Return—Inventory of property taken.
The officer, after execution of the warrant, shall promptly make a signed return
of the warrant to a magistrate of the issuing court and deliver a written or recorded
inventory of anything seized, stating the place where it is being held.
(h) Safekeeping of property.
The officer seizing the property shall be responsible for its safekeeping and
maintenance until the court otherwise orders.
(i) Magistrate to retain and file copies—Documents sealed for twenty days—
Forwarding of record to court with jurisdiction.
(i)(l) At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the
search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded testimony on
which the warrant is based and shall, within a reasonable time, file those sealed
documents in court files which are secured against access by the public. Those
documents shall remain sealed until twenty days following the issuance of the
warrant unless that time is extended or reduced under Section (m). Unsealed
search warrant documents shall be filed in the court record available to the public.
(i)(2) Sealing and retention of the file may be accomplished by:
(i)(2)(A) placing paper documents or storage media in a sealed envelope and
filing the sealed envelope in a court file not available to the public;
(i)(2)(B) storing the documents by electronic or other means under the control
of the court in a manner reasonably designed to preserve the integrity of the
documents and protect them against disclosure to the public during the period in
which they are sealed; or
(i)(2)(C) filing through the use of an electronic filing system operated by the
State of Utah which system is designed to transmit accurate copies of the
documents to the court file without allowing alteration to the documents after
issuance of the warrant by the magistrate.
(j) Findings required for sennce without notice.
If the magistrate finds upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may
be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to
any person if notice were given, the magistrate may direct that the officer need not
give notice of authority and purpose before entering the premises to be searched.
(k) Violation of health, safety, building, or animal cruelty laws or ordinancesWarrant to obtain evidence.
In addition to other warrants provided by this rule, a magistrate, upon a
showing of probable cause to believe a state, county, or city law or ordinance, has
been violated in relation to health, safety, building, or animal cruelty, may issue a
warrant for the puipose of obtaining evidence of a violation. A warrant may be
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obtained from a magistrate upon request of a peace officer or state, county, or
municipal health, fire, building, or animal control official only after approval by a
prosecuting attorney. A search warrant issued under this section shall be directed
to any peace officer within the county where the warrant is to be executed, who
shall serve the warrant. Other concerned personnel may accompany the officer.
(I) Remotely communicated search warrants.
(/)(1) Means of communication. When reasonable under the circumstances, a
search warrant may be issued upon sworn or affirmed testimony of a person who
is not in the physical presence of the magistrate, provided the magistrate is
satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. All
communication between the magistrate and the peace officer or prosecuting
attorney requesting the warrant may be remotely transmitted by voice, image, text,
or any combination of those, or by other means.
(/)(2) Communication to be recorded. All testimony upon which the magistrate
relies for a finding of probable cause shall be on oath or affirmation. The
testimony and content of the wan-ant shall be recorded. Recording shall be by
writing or by mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by other
means.
(0(3) Issuance. If the magistrate finds that probable cause is shown, the
magistrate shall issue a search warrant.
(0(4) Signing warrant. Upon approval, the magistrate may direct the peace
officer or the prosecuting attorney requesting a warrant from a remote location to
sign the magistrate's name on a warrant at a remote location.
(0(5) Filing of warrant and testimony. The warrant and recorded testimony
shall be retained by and filed with the court pursuant to Section (i). Filing may be
by writing or by mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by
other means.
(0(6) Usable copies made available. Except as provided in Sections (i) and (m)
of this rule, any person having standing may request and shall be provided with a
copy of the warrant and a copy of the recorded testimony submitted in support of
the application for the warrant. The copies shall be provided in a reasonably usable
form.
(m) Sealing and Unsealing of Search Warrant Documents.
(m)(l) Application for sealing of documents related to search warrants. A
prosecutor or peace officer may make a written or otherwise recorded application
to the court to have documents or records related to search warrants sealed for a
time in addition to the sealing required by Subsection (i)(l). Upon a showing of
good cause, the court may order the following documents to be sealed:
(m)(l)(A) applications for search warrants;
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(m)(l)(B) search warrants;
(m)(l)(C) affidavits or other recorded testimony upon which the search warrant
is based;
(m)(l)(D) the application, affidavits or other recorded testimony and order for
sealing the documents.
(m)(2) Sealing of search warrant documents. Search warrant documents are
public record that may be sealed in entirety or in part and not placed in the public
file if all or part of the information in them would:
(m)(2)(A) cause a substantial risk of harm to a person's safety;
(m)(2)(B) pose a clearly unwarranted invasion of or harm to a person's
reputation or privacy; or
(m)(2)(C) pose a serious impediment to the investigation.
Sealed documents shall be maintained in a file not available to the public. If a
document is not sealed in its entirety, the court may order a copy of the document
with the sealed portions redacted to be placed in the public file and an un-redacted
copy to be placed in the sealed file. Except as required by Section (i), no document
may be designated as "Filed under Seal" or "Confidential" unless it is
accompanied by a court order sealing the document.
(m)(3) Unsealing of documents. Any person having standing may file a motion
to unseal search warrant documents with notice to the prosecutor and law
enforcement agency. If the prosecutor or law enforcement agency files an
appropriate and timely objection to the unsealing, the court may hold a hearing on
the motion and objection. Where no objection to unsealing the documents is filed,
the defendant may prepare an order for entry by the court. The court may order the
unsealing of the documents or order copies of the documents to be delivered to a
designated person without unsealing the documents and require the person
receiving the documents not to disclose the contents to any other person without
the authorization of the court.
(m)(4) Length of time documents may remain sealed. The documents may
remain sealed until the court finds, for good cause, that the records should be
unsealed.
[Approved effective May 2. 2005; amended effective April 30, 2007.]
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Advisory Committee Notes
(a) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-201 Utah Code Ann.
(b) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-202 Utah Code Ann.
(c) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-203 Utah Code Ann.
(d) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-204 Utah Code Ann.
(e) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-205 Utah Code Ann.
(f) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-206 Utah Code Ann. The statute
contained the words "Failure to give oi ave a receipt does not render the evidence seized
inadmissible at trial." This rule is not a departure from that original legislative intent. While the
committee did not consider it necessary to address admissibility in a procedural rule, the
elimination of that language does not suggest that failure to comply with the receipt requirement
should be a basis for exclusion of the evidence seized.
(g) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-207 Utah Code Ann.
(h) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-208 Utah Code Ann.
(i) Subsection (1) is added in compliance with the order of the Utah Supreme Court in
Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79. Subsection (2) is added to allow for a planned electronic search
warrant system operated by the Utah Bureau Of Criminal Identification, or other systems which
might be employed by a magistrate. This provision supercedes the supervisory orders of the Court
in Anderson v. Taylor for that purpose.
(j) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-210(2) Utah Code .Ann.
(k) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-211 Utah Code .Ann.
(1) This section was formerly Rule 40 Remotely Communicated Search Warrants. Terms used
are intended to be interpreted liberally in order to facilitate remote communications as a means of
applying for and issuing search warrants while at the same time preserving the integrity of the
probable cause application and the terms of warrants that are authorized.
(m) (New section)
Cross References
Remotely communicated search warrant issued under this rule, see § 77-23-204.
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ADDENDUM C

EXHIBIT 1

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and sa}^:
That the Amant has reason to believe that William Thomas Domingacz possessed
and/or used drags and for alcohol
On the psrsonfs) of: William Domfngtiez
In the City of Ogdsn, County of Weber, State of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
Blood belonging to William Thomas Dommgucz, Your Affiant believes William Thomas Dornbgusz's
blood contains evidence of driving under £hc kfiueace of alcohol end/or drugs in "violation of Utah Coit
Arm. section 41~6a-5D2.
Your Afnaitf believes the blood coirisins the following substance:
* Drugs
* and/or Aloohol
Thst said property or evidence:
Is evidence of illega] conduct.
ArrlAHT STATEMENT:
Affiant is Trooper Chris Turlsy, a Police Officer witii the Utah Highway Pcxrol, and bang duly sworn,
deposes 2nd states that
Affiant has boon a Peace Officer for nearly two years crjirsridy serving as a State Troopsr -with, the Utah
Highway Parol, I have been trained in detecting and arresting alcohol and drug nnpairsd drivers. I have
received training in Standard Field Sobriety Tests znd is currently ccrdtbd to opsrals the Inroxilyser. I
regularly ccmc in contact "with, people who are under the influence of alcohol and/or dings while cmt on
patrol, Curn^yIhavc£n , cst^appiwdin2tcly50DUI*s.
The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrsat arc:
On June 3rd 2007, at 2ppraadnxs2+s$y 0102 hours, I observed a red Honda Civic driving southbound on Washingtcni
Boulsvsrd ct 2400 South hi lane 1 racing a silver passenger car. The vehicle was stopped by the scdvsaoa of
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my emergency lights. I approached the vehicle 2nd William Domingusz was is the driver ssztnof waging a ssst
belt. Domingucz had red, bloodshot, glassy looking eyes. As I spoke "with Domingusz, I noticed that hrs speech
was noticeably slurred. I conducted a records check on Domingusz using his name End date of birtL Tnis
infarmarion revealed that Domingusz had a aloohol revoked license 2nd was an alcohol restricted drivsr.
Domingusz denied consuming say aicohoL I placed Domingusz underCTestand could smell 2. strong odor of
sn alcohol beverage coming from his breath in the open air,
I requested Domingusz blow into a portable breath tester, however he refused to blow, When asked ifbe would
allow me to conduct field sobriety test, Domingusz said no and that he had been through this bsibre. Domingucz
refused to submit to any DUI field sobriety tests. I read Domingusz his DUI admonitions advising him of the
constqueaces of not submitting to my tests. Domingusz still would not cooperate sua refused to give & chemical
test
Domingusz has at least 4 prior DUI convictions in the past 10 years and be is currently on parole for a felony
DUI conviction.

WHEREFORE, the Affiant prays that the search warrant be issued for the ssizmre of said itemsfitany time any
or night due to thefollowingreasons:
It is currerdy nighttime, and there is a need to rsrve the warrant before daylight to secure important
evidence in this esse prior to it dissipating from his/her system.
• It is currently nighttime, end the suspect is currently in custody awaiting Eiithorizsdon ircm the court to
obtain his/her blood.
It is farther requested thst the omesr exectmng the warrant use a reasonable amount of force to obtain the
sample.
William Domingusz has refused to submit to E chemical test He may resist having his blood drawn,
therefore, ir inny be necessaryTOrestrain him while the biood is being drawn.

SaCX3NELEiISTPJCT COURT JUDGE

U7/17/2007 14:30 Fi-I

El 014

EXHIBIT 2

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
"^IZJSEH^WXKSAKT'

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH:
Proof by affidavit under cafe hsving been made this day before me, Judge Brent West, I sm satisfied fesfc
there is probable cause to belisvs that;
Qnfhe persQn(s) of.
In tire City of OgdeiL County of Weber, State of Utah, fher& h now certain property or evidence described
as;
Blood belonging to William Thomas Doraixigfcez bom 5-20-S2
That oantdns the following substance:

• Alcohol snd/or Drugs
Tnst said property or evidence:
h evidence of illegal conduct

YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED
Al anytime, dz\r or night
To msks a search of the above named or described persaafs) tor fee herein shove described property or
evidence, aid if you find fee same, or cay psit thereof to bring it farthwife before me at fee Second Judicial
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody subject to tks order of
mis court This court authorizes fee ornbsr to ETCT^* for fee retention offeisevidence,
SUBSCRIBED AND SWOEN TO BEFORE ME
ThisSrd day of June 2007,

024

143015

SECOND JUBICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT
NO:

The evidsncs listed below was taken from the person of William Thomas Datningucz
1. Blood which is bsiievsd to contain alcohol above the I&gal limit of .08 and/or drugs to
rmasr him acarrabfe of ssfsly opcrsdng a motor vshicb.
By virtue of a sesrdi warrant, ckt&d fbz 3rd dsy of Jims, 2007, snd issued by Judge Brsnt
West of the abovs-snrillad court
I* Troopsr Chris Turisy whom this warrant was executed by, do swear fast foe blood
listed above, was taken at my dirscdcjn, undcx sntkrify of ihs wEisnl issued by Judgs
Brsnt West, on June 3 rf , 2037
The sviebnee that WES takai by virtue of said warrant will be regained in my custody, and
sent to fee lab for analysis, 2nd will bz subject to the order of this court, or sny other
court, which may have jtmsdicdon ovar this evident.

AFFIANT

Subscribed and sworn to tefore me, this _

day of June, 2007.

Si,
SECOND DISTPJCT CCpRT JUDG2

ft?S
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH
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051

TEE COURT:

Okay.

This is State of Utah versus

William Dorrtinguez, 071901654.
MR. SHAW:

Go ahead, Mr. Shaw.

We call Trooper Turley to the s tand.
CHRIS TURLEY,

be>ing first duly sworn, was examine d
arid Testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHAW:
Q.

1

A

*

Troop er, please state your full name and occupation.
Chris Turley.

ITm a state trooper wit h the Utah

Highway Fatrc 1.
Q.

And h ow long have you been so employed 7

A.

Umm, a little over two years now.

Q.

Did y ou have occasion to come into con tac t with the

I defendant, WiH i am Thomas Dominguez, on June 3 id of 2007?
MR. GRAVIS:

We'll stipulate to that, Your Honor.

1 W e ' 11 sJtipula te that he arrested him for a OUI •
MR. SHAW:
MR. GRAVIS:

Okay.
I don't think we need to go through all

that.
MR. SHAW:
the sea.rch warrant.

Okay.

We'll get right to the issue of

There came a rime during rhe course of

1 the arr est wr.ere Mr. Dominguez refused to take an intoxylizer
[ test, or othe,r chemical test; is that correct?
A.

That' s correct.

2

Q.

And what did you do in response to that?

A.

At that tirre I wrote a search warrant.

I contacted

Judge West by telephone.
Q.

And when you say you wrote a search warrant; did you

write the warrant prior to contacting -- an affidavit for the
warrant prior to contacting Judge West?
A.

Thau's correct.

Q.

And where did you do that?

A.

At my office.

Q.

Okay.

The defendant, then, was still with you and

present at the time you were preparing the warrant, or
affidavit for warrant?
A.

Yes.

He was under supervision at the office.

MR. SHAW:

Your Honor, we have -- I suppose there's

a stipulation that the affidavit is accurate as reflected in
the memorandum?
MR. GRAVIS:

I stipulate that that's the affidavit

the officer prepared, but no: that that's what was rold to
Judge West.
MR. SHAW:

Okay.

That's fine.

Q. (3X MR. SHAir) So you prepared an affidavit and you
contacted Judge West telephonically?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Tell us about the telephone conversation.

What did

you inform Judge West of during one telephone conversation?
3

A.

I informed him of the subject's name, the reason for

the stop, all of the clues I observed as far as his red blood
shot eyesf

the smell of the odor of alcohol, the subject's

unwillingness to submit to a chemical test.
Q.

Do you have a copy of the affidavit for search

warrant?
A.

I do.

Q.

Look at that with me, if you will.

Let's just go

through it if we night for a moment line item by line item.
MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, we'll submit that the

affidavit can be entered so we don't have to go through all
of it.

If the state wants to submit the affidavit, it speaks

for itself.
MR. SHAW:
MR. GRAVIS:

Okay.
At least the alleged affidavit, let's

make it that way.
MR. SHAW:

Okay.

That's fine.

Q. (3Y MR. SHAW) What I'm getting at, trooper, is did
you in fact read part or all of this affidavit to Judge West
while you had him on the telephone?
A.

Umm, I did not read him every line of this affidavit.

I stated the facts to him.

I did state all of the facts that

are in this affidavit as far as the reason for the stop, the
reason for wanting to obtain a warrant.
O.

Are you able, looking at the affidavit, to tell us
4

^ 1 1

"uccre on t h e

/r

t c

teleohone?
hi:n one reason f o r the s t c p , which is o n

• -TJII,

on.e 11rsz race at on.e b o 11 om.
Q,

S o ar t ing v;i th on June 3rd, 2007,

approximately

" =: ?

0.

Oka v.

A.

Continuing all the way ohrougn wrier-

:ea

Domincruez T s blood - - --. " ~rtable blood tester i .r i i ie ref; ised
I also informed him that Dominguez had a
DUI convictions :.o the past ten years.

And that he was on

parole for a felony DUI conviction.
Q.

Okay.

And then, prior to you reading than portion

;est, were you placed under oath by Judge West?
X

Q.

W-5

Okay.

And at the conclusion of the affidavit, or at

least your statement to the judge, which included part of th~
affidavit, whan did Judge West direct you to do?
A.

Umin, he advised me to affix a signature to the

affidavit,
Q.

And was that done in accordance with the judge's

order at 0227 hours?

Q.

Okay.

And then did you sign the affidavir prior to

Judge W est directing you to sign his name 7
A.

I did not.

Q.

When did you sign th e affidavit?

A.

When he told me to.

Q.

Okay.

That's what I f m saying, when he told you to

sign i 4-L you went ahead and s igned the aff idavit 7
A.

That's correct.

Q.

In its current form?

I

A.

Correct.

J

Q .

And then looking at the search wa rrant, did you also

affix Judge West's name to thar search wa rrant at 0227 hours?
A.

I did.

Q.

Okay.

And then ulti]mately there is a r etur n on the

| warrant wherein you returned the warrant.

And it w as

subsequ-ently signed, it look s like, June 4th, 2007, by Judge
Jones?
A.
Q-

Was there any other attempt: to ma ke a r ecor d of the

teleph o ne conference between yourself and Judge West du ring
this e n tire process?

1

A.

No.
KB.

HU3IS:

MR. GRAVIS:
TEE COURT:

Okay.

That's all.

I have no questions
You may step down.

Thank you.

An y
6

K R . £EJ.W:
., i you want to a roue
MR.

SEZJZ:

:ne a r aliment

:>ncr

that

made is straightforwsomewhat modified the previous statute as I read it and
defines recording to include a written :•=.--< !
a r* c ;=,
jonvers

*~ -|

Trooper Turley has a written record that was

ed simultaneously with his conversation with Judge

11 j oontained in that affidavit to Judge west.
iCted him, u: " n
13 | to the warrant.

+;

- " n" ". c. J "i

Judge West

*

'iz

-.

name

That warrant was then issued.

I want to be specific about this, because I -"---".*; .' ! defines recorded or recording as including the
16 j "recording of testimony, a return or other communication or
17 i

: ;

_

.

. ..

._ -

. : ther replication that is

intended by the person making the recording to have the same
effect as the original."

~~ '

written docurne: 11

Troop e• r

Turley followed that document during his conversation.
Then, if you look at rule 40(1) (-2), the recording of
t e s t i in o i : y .: s s u f f i c i e: 11 :i f i n written f o rm.
affidavit is.

That's what the

It was substantially complied with .in

accordance with rr ::] e 4 0 a i i d w e thin k :i ::'" s a v a I i d warrant.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Go ahead.
7

MR. GRAVIS:

Well, Your Honor, I agree that rule 4 0

has replaced the statute, but the stare is skipping over rule
i(l), which says that
TH3 COURT:

—
Let me get it out.

Hold on a second.

(Pause in the proceedings.)
IK'S COURT:
MR. GRAVIS:

4 0 (i) (1) .

TFJ& COURT:

You know, I guess I have my 2 007 book in

my office.
to.

And you were looking at what?

I thought I had one out here, but I don't seem

Why don't you read it to me.
MR. GRAVIS:

"At the time of issuance, the

magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the search
warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded
testimony on which the warrant is based, and shall, within a
reasonable time, file these sealed documents in court files
which are secured against access

by the public.

Those

documents shall remain sealed until 20 days following the
issuance of the warrant unless that time is extended or
reduced under section M.

Unsealed search warrant documents

shall be filed in the court record available to the public."
So I submit that rule (i)(1) requires that that record be
prepared by the magistrate, not by the officer.

There's no

evidence that any recording of the testimony of the officer
was made by the magistrate.
there was nothing there.

When we tried to obtain a copy

There was no signed copy

of the

TEE COURT:
HP

There's nothing on file here?

GH Ji VI3 :

state has already filed, which is the warrant signed by t h e
officer with Judge West's signature and one a.ffirl-."4-

*"""" 4" "'

prepared with the officer -TE2 COURT:
;

So 'what's your primary complaint

about

: ;; ;>

MR. ' GEJlVTS :

There's no affidavit,

There ' s no f acts

and Judge West that is required to be made by ::he magi st:rat•= •
not by the officer.
TEE COURT:
Tvtp

SPJ~«,Vu3 i

TEE COURT:

What':: required to be made?
Ine i *::;v \' Ji Q
Okay.

Let's say he came in and b r o u g h t

a copy of the a f f i d a v i t :! r i o: i M o n d a y,

.:....

.

rr

whatever the next business days was, do you think that's
sufficient?
2£R. GRArv IS :

K o.

It says at the t ime of i s s u a n c e .

It clearly says at the time of issuance the magistrate s h a l l
Not mav f

shall.

So the macistrata !".-.: . " - > ..-- i„ nue uirne

of the issuance of the telephonic warrant or any other
warrant f

h e f s got to make a signed copy a: id a copy of t h e

affidavit.

If there's no affidavit it says or other

recorded
9

test imorly.

3ut it's at the time of the issu.ance of the

warr ant.
THE COURT:

I guess ITm wondering, is it your

comp.Lairit that he didn't read verbatim the a ffidavit?
MR. GRAVIS:
TEE COURT:

No.

My point is —

I'm just trying to unde rstand exac tly

| what you 're complain ing about.
KR. GRAVIS:

Our complaint is that there's no

evidence to base the search warrant on.

The recoraing which

is required under th e statute has to be> rrade by the
magistrate and it r s not done here.

So we have -- we don't

know wha t he told th e magistrate becaus e, I submit, the work
1 prodiict is not good enough.

The law re quire s that the

magistra te make the recording, not the of fieer.
copy of the rule rig nt here m
TE3 COURT:

I have a

front of me.

So in other words if he had faxed a copy

of this to him or e-mailed it to him?
KR. GRAVIS:

That might t>e goc)d enough so the

magistra te could fil e that at the time of uh e issuance cf the
warr:m t or have a copy, but he didn't.
that

JUG

Ther e's nothing here

ge West reta ined a copy cf any conve rsation, or even

a copy c f the warrant, which the rule specifically requires.
THB COURT:
KR. SHAW:

Do you want to res pond?
Yeah.

I think 40 (1) and 40(1) are

mutually exclusive given the change m

the law and statute,
10

tne

Kind or

tnmg

r s s t i n a ws h.
.mportant part is was Officer Turley s*
::: :.e :es:::v accurate-"
.en I D :::5in :r.e wari:
cirpy vcirh ire, but _ don'
T ^

••-»r

c r- :=> '

warrants,

x
£CR. SRA.VT S :
rp'^-TFj COURT:
ma as,

:o :aJ:;

0kay .
I'll get you a decision when I get

[n the meantime, I guess we'll leave che tri a] c
"

1 assume the state will proceed on

~ S1

anyway, regardless of the warrant, or trie arridavit o:
test results, the blood
MR. SE.&W:

sample?

Yeah. • It may change our prospects fc:

negotiations, though, Your Honor.
\

x

coi

; ; - f- a

:rI3 COURT:
decision out to yo
GRAVIS:

All rioht

i

11 do mv best to qet

. ..J -J other things on the table als-:
We have a pretrial scheduled in t w o

weeics.
THE COURT:

I should have it by then.

11

MR. SHAW:
ZzZZ

Does it show a nonjury trial setting?

COURT:

No, a jury setting.

All right.

Thank

1 you.
MR. GRAVIS:
MR. SHAW:

Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, I received a telephone call

from the toxicologic t who will be out of the country from
Octob er 1st through October 19th, which is right when this
trial is set.

I would ask that we strike that date.

MR. GRAVIS:
see vv hat happens.

Just leave it until the pretrial and

I don't have any problem if we strike the

1 trial date at. the time of the pretrial.
MR. SHAW:

Should we strike the trial and set it for

| a review penc.ing you r decision?

1

Ird like to leave it where it is.

MR. GRAVIS:

If

| we win and they want to proceed to trial, I don't want to
have to wait for a rtew trial date.

They won't need the

toxicologist —
MR. SHAW:

If in fact we lose we won't need the

toxicologist.
THE COURT:

I've got another jury trial starting

that Wednesday with another person named Dominguez.

I don't

know who it i_s, but it's obviously not this person.

But it

may be bumped anyway.

Let's just leave it alone for now and

I r ll gee a decision out.

Thanks.

!Hearing concluded.)

12
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THE COURT:

State of Utah versus William Ooiriinguez,

071901654.
KR. GRAVIS:

This is set for pretrial, but it T s

i first on for a decisi.on
|

TH2 COURT:
suppress.

—

Yes, a decision on the motion to

Ai ter revi ewing the rule again and after reviewing

my notes on this, it would appear that there's a technical
violation of the rule , of the new rule.

Part of the problem

wirh that rul e is that it provides for a telephonic search
warrant, whic h was do ne, authorized by Judge West.

But if

vou refer bac k to the previous part of the rule it requires
that the magi strate s imultaneously is supposed to seal the
search warren t and th e affidavit.

Well, that's somewhat

! difficult to do when you have a telephonic search warrant,
} unless you actually physically tape record it, which we don't
have the faci lity to do that.
So although there ! s a technical glitch, and I realize it
was never fil ed eithe r and that's another part of the
problem, but I don't believe, given my review of the case
law, that tha t invali dates the warrant.

I'm not sure what

the remedy is , but I don't think it invalidates the warrant.
1ZR. GRAVIS:

[
this

case.

Okay, Your Honor, then we need to pass

I think v,•e're going to resolve it anyway today,

but I need some time to talk with Mr. Shaw.
1

TrtZ COURT:

Okay.

That's fine.

We had to strike
2

W 1 *. r.r S 3

Ur.aVailaOlllt " "

f

a h e a d and talk and we ' 1

MR. GRAVIS:

TEE COURT:
2£R. GRAV*is*

If we can r e c a l l numr

.i --.am

Stare v e r s u s W i l l i a m D o m i n g u e z .
Yo; :r Honcr (

a 3 I indicated before, we

h a d a rresolution, i just needed to clarify a couple of
i, -'_,-, -,

-

s going to plead quilt;
'insurance .

. - '.J,.. • d decree felony

The state will dismiss the remaining
or

appeal the court's decision on one morion ro suppress.
!£H. SHAW:
THE COURT:

That's correct, Your Honor.
Okay

For c: :.e record on my decision

again,, so it's clear in case there is an appeal.
tnere mav nave oeen a

Although;

.avion

m

t: to search warrant and affidavit were nor delivered t: the
courthouse sealed, the rule also contemplates somef* . • ::
that's virtually impossible to do when you have a telephonic
search warrant and that's to simultaneously have the
magistrate seal it.

There would be no reason to do it over

the phone if that was the case.

I think that's a'problem

that needs to be strsichtened out bv - •• -- -tie. •
—••

r

e c o g n i z e t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t and

affidavit
3

were not filed by the officer with the court, although it wa.s
highly likely that the judge had ordered him to do so.

Those

types of things are pro forma and I don't believe that based
en that alone it would invalidate the search warrant when
there was otherwise probable cause to issue it.

It was done

under oath by the officer on the phone after Judge West swore
him in, according to the testimony.

I think that's

sufficient to at least justify the issuance of the search
warrant and the action on the search warrant.
I don't know if that creates anything additional or not?
MR. GRAVIS:

No.

T~LE COURT:

Okay.

I'm sure I brought the file out

with me, but now we can't seem to find it.
a hurry to attend a meeting.

I know you're in

"We can either pass it for a

moment or come back to it next week.
(Pause in the proceedings.)
TEE COURT:

We'll do it next Tuesday.

Tuesday at two o'clock.
anyway.

We'll do

it

This was a date for a decision only

I'll strike the trial date, assuming you're going to

be entering pleas.
MR. GRAVIS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

That's all the

matters I have.
TZ.U COURT:

Okay.

(Hearing concluded.)
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